Legislation
U.S. Supreme Court
McCARTY v. McCARTY, 453 U.S. 210 (1981)
McCARTY v. McCARTY.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT.
No. 80-5.
Argued March 2, 1981.
Decided June 26, 1981.
A regular commissioned officer of the United States Army who retires after 20 years of service is entitled to retired pay. Retired pay terminates with the officer's death, although he may designate a beneficiary to receive any arrearages that remain unpaid at death. In addition, there are statutory plans that allow the officer to set aside a portion of his retired pay for his survivors. Appellant, a Regular Army Colonel, filed a petition in California Superior Court for dissolution of his marriage to appellee. At the time, he had served approximately 18 of the 20 years required for retirement with pay. Under California law, each spouse, upon dissolution of a marriage, has an equal and absolute right to a half interest in all community and quasi-community property, but retains his or her separate property. In his petition, appellant requested, inter alia, that his military retirement benefits be confirmed to him as his separate property. The California Superior Court held, however, that such benefits were subject to division as quasi-community property, and accordingly ordered appellant to pay to appellee a specified portion of the benefits upon retirement. Subsequently, appellant retired and began receiving retired pay; under the dissolution decree, appellee was entitled to approximately 45% of the retired pay. On review of this award, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting appellant's contention that because the federal scheme of military retirement benefits pre-empts state community property law, the Supremacy Clause precluded the trial court from awarding appellee a portion of his retired pay.
However, on June 26, 1981 the United States Supreme Court ruled in the McCarty versus McCarty decision "that the military retirement system confers no entitlement to retired pay upon the retired member’s spouse, and does not embody even a limited community property division." The McCarty decision further stated that "the language, structure, and history of the statutes made it crystal clear that retired pay continues to be the sole and personal entitlement of only the retiree." The high court based its decision on the United States Constitution, the applicable federal law, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The high court did not prevent state courts from awarding alimony, child support, and / or maintenance to a former spouse. Thus, this ruling supported long standing court practice that military retired / retainer pay was NOT a community property asset!
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.
ROMAN v. NIEVES, NO. RE-86-293 (1987)
ROMAN v. NIEVES
LEOPOLDO DELUCCA ROMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant
v.
OLGA M. COLON NIEVES, Defendant and Appellee
NO. RE-86-293
San Juan, Puerto Rico, November 25, 1987
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico* has ruled that military retirement pay is the sole property of the Armed Forces member. Section 1408(c)(1) of the federal act allows state courts to so determine whether the pension is the sole property of the service person or the conjugal partnership. In the hearing it was stated that a public servant’s right to a retirement pension for years of service has a respectable and moral content and constitutes an assurance of dignity for the man or woman who, having devoted their fruitful years to public service should find himself unprotected at the final stage of his life or feel that he has become a burden for his relatives or the state.
*§ 1408 (a)(1)(A). Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders, “any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.”
H.R. 2200 - Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act Fairness Amendments of 1991
H.R. 2200 ”Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act Fairness Amendments of 1991”, originally proposed in the 102nd Congress, attempted to address remarriage of a former spouse ending division of MRP, statute of limitations on former spouse claims to MRP prohibiting retroactive claims, prohibiting any court from directing when a uniformed service member must retire in order to effectuate payment of MRP in a divorce, and prohibition of the use of disability pay in calculation of benefits to a former spouse, pursuant to existing Federal law.
H.R. 2537 - Uniformed Services Spouses’ Equity Act of 1997
H.R. 2537 “Uniformed Services Spouses’ Equity Act of 1997”, originally proposed in the 105th Congress, attempted to again address termination of payments to former spouses upon remarriage of the former spouse, award of MRP to be based upon rank at time of divorce versus at time of retirement (to address the windfall benefit), a statute of limitations on former spouse claims to MRP, and the offset to MRP of a retired uniformed service member’s disability pay dollar for dollar having no effect on former spouse claims to that pay as marital property.
Adkins v. Rumsfeld
On April 30, 2004 a non-profit organization filed complaints with the United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia in Alexandria, VA. After over three years of enduring the Legal Process to obtain justice, on June 18, 2007 the US Supreme Court refused to hear the ULSG PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.